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Time, intersubjectivity, and musical relationship in 
Alfred Schutz
Riccardo Venturini
In this work I tackle certain aspects of the relationship between time and intersubjectivity in Alfred 
Schutz. I present a summary of the methodological architecture of the Austrian sociologist, outlining 
the specificity of the relationship between time and consciousness. I discuss the treatment of the musical 
experience as an example of the peculiar declination of a series of temporal dynamics connected to the 
intersubjective creation of meanings. Finally, I set out some thoughts related to the debate on the relation-
ship between time, intersubjectivity and music in Schutz.
The musical relationship is a context endowed with meaning, not the object of conceptualization, that 
allows us to identify in a paradigmatic way the relationship between the subjective sense and experience 
of the other. The theory of appresentation of Schutz is the center of the process of constitution of meaning 
of the understanding of the other. The emergence of meaning is related to the dynamics of the passive and 
active poles of the consciousness and the constitution, in the we-relation, of a radically intersubjective 
dimension that exceeds the Cartesian distinction between inside and outside.
1. Time, consciousness and action
Time is one of the central categories of the noetic analysis of Schutz. It’s well 
known that one of the criticisms of the Austrian sociologist of the comprehen-
sive sociology of Weber is that of not having given sufficient attention to time 
in the examination of meaning, subjectively understood. Schutz reworks the 
theses on time of Bergson and Husserl in a synthesis that helps us to under-
stand a number of processes related to the constitution of subjectivity and the 
intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life1.
According to Schutz, «the problem of meaning is a time problem», it per-
tains to «internal time consciousness» (Schutz 1967: 12). Time is not a matter 
of conscience: it is consciousness that constitutes time. 
1 I’ll take for granted the theory of  finite provinces of  meaning, which constitutes the scope 
from which emerges the problem of  time in the eyes of  Schutz and the fundamental theme of  
the typicality of  experience, which Natanson explains, is perhaps one of  the main terms of  the 
vocabulary of  Schutz (Natanson 1973: 111). 
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The first aspect of the link between temporality and experience implies 
the distinction between sense of action and sense of the action accomplished. 
According to Schutz, we must clearly distinguish between the current action 
(actio) and the act made (actum) (Schutz 1967: 39). The act performed refers to 
the past, while the action is related to the future, the present course with its 
protentions and anticipations. Since the action of the actor is future-oriented 
this anticipatory nature leads to the engagement of a project that precedes it 
in the timeline (ibid.: 82-83). The project is the temporal expression of inten-
tionality, it has the form of the future perfect (modo futuri exacti) and has as its 
object the action accomplished in fantasy. Only the completed actions are 
accessible to the reflective glance, they are acts conceived in the form of time 
past (modo praeterito), while in planning future action the subject refers to its 
hypothetical conclusion2.
As in Weber, the sense of action is linked to the motives; between project 
and motives for action there is a fundamental temporal connection. The au-
thor distinguishes between “final” motives (in-order-to) and “causal” motives 
(because):
From the actor’s point of  view, ‘in-order-to motives’ concern the future [...]. In 
short, the aim motivates the project. “Because motives” instead refer to the past 
and represent the motivation of  the aim itself  of  the action. [...] The nature 
of  this type of  motive is complex: it is rooted in the actor’s personality, in his 
unconscious. It is sufficient here to recall that Schütz affirms the quasi-causal 
nature of  such motives, given that they operate behind the actor’s back, so to 
speak. Furthermore, while I am living the course of  the action, I am also turned 
towards the future. I am therefore driven by in-order-to motives. To grasp the 
“because motives” the actor must turn to his past (Muzzetto 2006b: 15).
According to Schutz, there are two distinct attitudes towards experience: 
the direct and the reflective attitude. The direct attitude is the direct experi-
ence over the course of events of that which is experienced in the “here and 
now.” In this “to live in their own actions” the actors have a very low level of 
awareness of the acts they commit. In the reflective attitude, however, the ac-
2 Moreover, says Schutz, the knowledge now available «at the time of  projecting [...]must nec-
essarily be different from that which I shall have when the now merely projected act will have 
been materialized. Until then I shall have grown older and if  nothing else has changed, at least 
the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowl-
edge. In other words, projecting like any other anticipation carries along its empty horizons 
which will be filled in merely by the materialization of  the anticipated event. This constitutes 
the intrinsic uncertainty of  all forms of  projecting» (Schutz 1962: 69).
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tor turns his attention to his own experience by engaging in an act to reverse 
the flow of consciousness, figuratively “stops to think.” With reflection they 
delineate clearly those experiences that flow indiscriminately in durée (Schutz 
1967: 102). The change of attitude leads to a change of the temporal structure. 
With reflection you stop to think, time is metaphorically stopped by awareness, 
even if the reflection does not stop the flow of internal time and the changing 
of knowledge underlying this change. Thus emerges the problem of the time 
lag between the flow of experience and the acquisition of knowledge3, that ac-
cording to some is a paradox. The paradox of meaning that would imply the 
contradiction between lived experience and present experience: if only the first 
is delineable reflexively, then the second would seem excluded from the attribu-
tion of meaning4. The solution to this paradox is present in the same theory of 
action of Schutz, that is the frame in which the study of the structure of con-
sciousness occurs. In the predicative moment of reflection there is also active a 
set of experienced imagined futures. If in Weber only the action is meaningful, 
and not the behavior5, for Schutz the meaning of the action is in the act. We 
have seen that the project is taking a position on the future. The meaning is 
the result of the intentionality of the reflective act. As Muzzetto explains, this
3 Muzzetto notes that the relationship between sense and temporality is further complicated by 
the character of  the intentional units. The structure of  these units of  meaning emerges in the 
predicative sphere of  transversal intentionality, but has its roots in the pre-predicative sphere 
of  longitudinal intentionality. The latter is connected to a context, which assumes the temporal 
relationship between current, future and past experiences. The context consists of  quanta, by in-
divisible elements in the flow of  internal time that depend on the passive syntheses (Schutz and 
Luckmann, 1973: 56). Put another way, the intentional units are relational units that consist 
of  idealizations of  the and-so-on (e-cosi-via) and the you-can-always-renew (si-può-sempre-di 
nuovo) idealizations connected to internal time. «The structure of  quanta is consistent with the 
notion of  flux. Thus, the now of  the stream of  consciousness, the present of  human experience, 
is not an instant experienced as separate from the preceding and the following instants: it is a 
“vivid present” which, like James’s “specious present”, 17 is tied to the past and to the future» 
(Muzzetto 2006b: 11).
4 According to Cox, this paradox is the result of  a misinterpretation of  the theses on inner con-
sciousness of  time by Husserl. Schutz would read through the pattern of  Bergson and would 
face an insurmountable predicament. As Muzzetto explains, «Cox fails to discern the original-
ity of  Schütz’s position (Although it is certainly true that in his use of  Husserl and Bergson, 
Schütz is not greatly concerned with proving the compatibility of  their theoretical approaches, 
nor with providing an analytical demonstration of  his own stance)» (Muzzetto 2006b: 13).
5 Giolo Fele speaks of  “Weber’s paradox”: if  behavior endowed with meaning is only that 
which is conscious, that in which one has a «reciprocal intentional orientation [...] in which the 
meaning is given by sharing a repertoire of  meanings, a common set of  symbols that draw on» 
sender and receiver, then most of  the daily actions, such as those of  routine, are foolish (Fele 
2001: 204).
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA168
represents the central point of  the solution of  the problematic node related to 
the relationship between time and meaning: the project makes significant both 
the act and the action. Only the possibility of  imagining an action completed 
allows me to design and then to genuinely bring into being the individual phas-
es of  the action: these depend on the final outcome to be achieved. The action 
can be understood as consisting of  partial actions each of  which represents 
a step towards the final result. The what resolves the problem of  the unitary 
character of  the action and its articulation. The view that the meaning does 
not belong to the immediacy of  the experience in the stream of  consciousness 
thus does not mean that the sense operates as a sort of  Paretian “derivation” 
or in any case a rationalization. The what would be inevitable if  it were at-
tributable only to a reflection ex post on the experience. But we can anticipate 
our steps reflexively. The possibility of  the meaning of  the present is thus in 
the capacity to anticipate, to think in advance about the results (imagined) of  
our steps. Even the action, not only the experience is therefore endowed with 
meaning. And so the present also acquires sense from the anticipation of  the 
future (Muzzetto 2006b: 14).
To argue that the meaning is in the project, doesn’t mean to establish an 
exact match of the future results of the action, nor does it mean to put in 
place an ontological separation between spheres. The project is not realized, 
for example, because the reality is in itself risky or because the actor is un-
able to discover a “right combination” able to put him/her in the condition 
to discover a state of future things connected to a presumed actual uniform-
ity. This view leads to naive realism, because it would mean bringing to the 
world of science aspects of the world of common sense, in which uncertainty 
is suspended “for practical purposes”. The central point is that the future 
will always be configured differently from what has been sketched previ-
ously because the knowledge available and the system of relevances of the 
subject will necessarily be different6. The meaning given to a point in time 
“A” will always be different from the meaning given to point in time “B”. In 
a certain sense the changing of knowledge is an important imposition. The 
relationship between project and reality is a relationship of construction in 
which the time elements of the project shape what is called “reality”7. This 
6 Schutz writes: «Until then I shall have grown older and if  nothing else has changed, at least 
the experiences I shall have had while carrying out my project will have enlarged my knowl-
edge» (Schutz 1962: 69).
7 One must always bear in mind that “reality” in Schutz is a deliberately controversial concept 
that expresses a tension between the idea of  common sense, of  something that exists “out 
there”, and the phenomenological conception that what exists “out there” is always something 
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applies not only for the future but also for the attribution of meaning to past 
events8.
I think the central aspect of the paradox of time is not its solution, impos-
sible as in all paradoxes, but its neutralization. This recalls the comprehensive 
methodological system of Schutz, who translates the principle of “return of 
things to themselves” of Husserl into a radically empirical analysis. With this 
in mind, the meaning that can be established from the “specious present” of 
the social relationship is central, a time that cannot be absolutely defined9.
It seems that the reason for this is the following: We have no power to define 
the limits of  our specious present, to draw its border lines over against the past 
or the future. Our stream of  consciousness is itself  articulated. Impulses and 
resting places, periods of  tension and relaxation alternate. Wave follows wave, 
each wave having its crest and valley. Each of  these impulses is experienced as 
a unit, a movement in inner time which tends to fulfil its final phase as soon as 
meaningful that becomes such only after being experienced. The author says: «I am afraid I do 
not exactly know what reality is, and my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I share 
my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of  all time» (Schutz 1964: 88).
8 The vision of  Schutz can be considered a special variant of  the hermeneutical circle. It has a 
reciprocal relationship between the constitution of  experience, sedimentation in the depths of  
knowledge available, activation facing a new experience.
9 One of  the sources from which Schutz draws is Augustine of  Hippo, according to which 
time is made of  more moments that follow one another without ever being present, of  past 
moments that are collected when they no longer exist, of  future moments that never exist. Ac-
cording to Augustine, time exists in the consciousness and not outside of  this, consciousness is 
the only way to measure it. Time does not have a factual consistency, that is to say it does not 
have a measurable extension outside of  consciousness. The past is no longer because when it 
is collected by the consciousness it is no longer present, the present is elusive because we grasp 
it when it has already passed, the future is never present because it is anticipated by the con-
science. Augustine writes: «What then is time? If  no one asks me, I know; if  I want to explain it 
to someone who asks, I no longer know. And yet I calmly affirm to know that if  nothing passed 
there would be no past, and if  nothing happens, there would be no future, and if  nothing ex-
isted there would be no present. So in that sense there exists two of  these times, the past and 
the future, if  the past is no more and the future is not yet? With regard to the present, if  it were 
always present and were not to lapse into the past, there would not be time, but eternity. So if  
the present, to be a part of  time, exists inasmuch as it elapses into the past, in what sense can 
we say that it also exists? If  indeed its only reason for being is that it will not exist: in reality it’s 
true, as we say, that time exists only as much as it tends not to be» (Augustine 1989: Book XI, 
14:17). The size of  conscience recalls the reflexive centrality of  the present. Humans measure 
time through the soul, understood as a reflection on the past, the present and the future. Au-
gustine speaks of  “trinity of  the present.” The past, present and future, Augustine substitutes, 
respectively, the present of  the past, recalling the memory, the present of  the present, linked to 
perception-attention, the present of  the future, related to anticipation (ibid.: Book XI, 20:26).
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it starts. If  we interrupt this development before the impulse comes to an end, 
if  we make this impulse abortive, we cannot grasp our specious present and the 
relevant sector of  our past adherent to it (Schutz 1996: 274).
2. Time, intersubjectivity and music
2.1 Time and intersubjectivity
The time difference between direct attitude and reflection is essential to un-
derstanding the difference between comprehension of experiences, of one’s self, 
and that of the experiences of others, of the Alter. Schutz says:
We cannot approach the realm of  our Self  without an act of  reflective turn-
ing. But what we grasp by the reflective act is never the present of  our stream 
of  thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past. Just now the 
grasped experience pertained to my present, but in grasping it I know it is 
not present any more. And, even if  it continues, I am aware only by an after-
thought that my reflective turning towards its starting phases has been simul-
taneous with its continuation. The whole present, therefore, and also the vivid 
present of  our Self, is inaccessible for the reflective attitude. We can only turn 
to the stream of  our thought as if  it had stopped with the last grasped experi-
ence. In other words, self-consciousness can only be experienced modo praeterito, 
in the past tense (Schutz 1962: 172-173).
In this step, Schutz further specifies a crucial moment in time: to live in 
our acts, the “vivid present”, as opposed to the indirect reflexive grasping of 
the ego or self, in time past. The vivid present, or “specious present”, is the 
civic time or common time, is the result of the union between the internal 
time of the flow of consciousness, quality, and external time, cosmic, quanti-
fied. The vivid present is the matrix of all social relations, it is the dimension 
that regulates the various levels of actors’ lives, making possible the intersub-
jective coordination among human beings (Schutz, 1962: 222)10.
The vivid present is particularly important because it is linked to that idea 
of “being in the world” as pre-predicative evidence of human experiences. 
10  Berger and Luckmann emphasize the “constriction” of  the present vividly: “The temporal 
structure of  everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with 
which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as con-
tinuous time and finite. The same temporal structure [...] is coercive. I cannot reverse at will 
the sequences imposed by it” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 41).
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Schutz takes some concepts present in the thought of Merleau-Ponty to ex-
plain how this temporal mode, full of intersubjectivity from the start, is fun-
damental for the categories of thought: 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the thinking of  the normal mind does not con-
sist in subsuming experiences under categories. The category imposes upon 
the terms which it unites a significance which is exterior to them. This syn-
thesis originates in the vivid present, that is, in the pre-predicative evidence 
of  the unique world to which all our experiences refer. This primordial world 
is structurized by a system of  significations, that is, of  correspondences, rela-
tions, participations, which the concrete subject spreads around himself, liv-
ing in them and through them and using them not by an explicit conceptual 
procedure but merely by his being within the world. From there the higher 
structurizations of  our conscious life are built up by reactivating our sedi-
mented experiences and amalgamating them with the actual vivid thought 
(ibid.: 274).
According to the Austrian sociologist, intersubjectivity is a given in the 
world of everyday life. The author believes that the vision of Husserl’s tran-
scendental intersubjectivity leads to a series of insurmountable aporia. In the 
world of everyday life, the other is cultured appresentatively11 by the size of 
the we-relation, which is the social relationship in which you live a kind of 
fusion with the other. In this relationship the other body is the pre-eminent 
vehicle of understanding the other12. This understanding does not imply an 
act of inference, there is no perception of a body and then the attribution 
of meaning through a reflexive act. The understanding of the other comes 
directly. I gather the other in the pre-predicative sphere because the signs of 
his/her body (facial expressions, proxemics) immediately recall “our” experi-
11  Schutz reworks the theory of  appresentation of  Husserl adapting it to his analysis on inter-
subjectivity in the world of  everyday life. «It seems to us that Husserl’s theory of  appresenta-
tion covers all cases of  significative and symbolic references dealt with by the various authors 
discussed before. In all these cases an object, fact, or event is not experienced as a “self,” but as 
standing for another object which is not given in immediacy to the experiencing subject. The 
appresenting member “wakens” or “calls forth” or “evokes” the appresented one. [...] These 
appresentational relations may occur on various levels: appresented an object may in turn 
appresent another one, there are signs of  signs, and symbols of  symbols, etc. Moreover, the 
appresenting immediate experience need by no means consist in the perception of  the physical 
object: it may be a recollection, a fantasm, a dream, etc» (ibid.: 297).
12  In the natural attitude, the body functions as an index of  the experience of  others, «the mere 
existence of  a frame of  reference referring to the Other, of  a system of  interpretable signs or 
symbols, for instance, is sufficient for the belief  in the existence of  other persons» (ibid.: 177).
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ence. The size of us is constitutive of social reality; as Natanson explains, it is 
the systemic root of society13.
The fact that I can grasp the Other’s stream of  thought, and this means the 
subjectivity of  the alter ego in its vivid present, whereas I can grasp my own 
self  only by way of  reflection on its past, leads us to a definition of  the alter ego: 
the alter ego is that subjective stream of  thought which can be experienced in 
its vivid present. [...] The alter ego, therefore, is that stream of  consciousness 
whose activities I can seize in their present by my own simultaneous activities. 
This experience of  the Other’s stream of  consciousness in vivid simultaneity I 
propose to call the general thesis of  the alter ego’s existence. It implies that this stream 
of  thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own 
consciousness (Schutz 1962: 173-74).
The union of the streams of experience is the main theme of the reflections 
of Schutz on intersubjectivity. It is a theme that recalls the size of the precon-
ceptuality of the sense of social relations, the human universe of pure sociability 
emerging in the temporal sphere of the vivid present.
2.2 The musical relationship and its characters
The analysis of the constitutive dimension of time is configured in a particular 
way in the analyzes on the musical relationship. Schutz was interested in music 
as a social phenomenon to be understood as an act of co-construction and con-
veyance of meanings. The intent of the Austrian sociologist was to provide a rig-
orous theoretical basis for the “scandalous” problem of intersubjectivity, a theme 
taken for granted in the social sciences (as was the problem of language). The 
correctness of following a melody, whether its a piece of music or a symphony, is 
the nucleus of the analysis on the intersubjective character of music. According 
to the author,
music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet 
this meaningful context can be communicated: The process of  communication 
between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individ-
ual performer or a group of  coperformers. Among all these participants there 
prevail social relations of  a highly complicated structure (Schutz 1964: 159).
13 Natanson asserts that, with the theory of  we-relation as «systemic root of  a shared world» 
(Natanson 1977: 110), Schutz passes from an ego-centered approach to one centered on society 
and intersubjectivity.
173TIME, INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND MUSICAL RELATIONSHIP
When Schutz speaks of a meaningful context he wants to underline that there 
are social rules followed by the actor to establish the correct meaning: the in-
terpreter’s task is to understand the correct meaning (Schutz 1996: 243). In ad-
dition, the standards of correctness are not connected to the conceptual aspect. 
Schutz contrasted language with music. Language has a function of mainly se-
mantic representation, it is formed by a series of terms (nouns, verbs, adjectives) 
which refer to a conceptual scheme. This allows interpretation of the world and 
presents an syntactic apparatus applicable to propositions that can be correct 
or not on the basis of operational rules. To the contrary, music does not have 
a representative function, does not follow operational rules (ibid.: 244). Never-
theless, the experience of music has its own syntax, which is connected to the 
relationship between time and intersubjectivity: it is therefore always possible to 
determine whether the execution of a piece of music is correct or not.
The musical experience has a meaning that can be grasped only polytheti-
cally14, because it is connected to the flow of internal time. The music is an 
entity made of time that is apperceived “step-after-step” independently of the 
spatial perception15, it can not be grasped monothetically, which is equivalent 
to saying that it is experienced without a conceptual scheme connected to 
objects defined spatially. Schutz writes, when we hear a piece of music we 
participate in the flow of the music, «the flux of music and the flux of the 
stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity 
between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a 
unit which is indivisible» (ibid.: 250). 
The focal point of the musical experience, then, is the presence of a nucleus 
of meanings unable to be conceptualized. The significance of this nucleus is 
similar to that of the social relationship of us16 because in the here and now of 
14 The attribution of  meaning can happen in two ways: polythetically or monothetically. Polythet-
ic understanding involves reconstitution of  the steps through which the sense of  an experience is 
formed. With a polythetic act those courses of  events that have made the experience are retraced 
by searching for the explanatory connections. The monothetic understanding, however, is the 
synthetic grasp, in a single act, the polythetic sense of  the experiences (Schutz 1970b: 80-81). One 
essential point must be stressed: the ability to monothetically grasp experience polythetically con-
stituted indicates the presence of  connections of  meaning between the experiences themselves.
15 «Music does not require any kinaesthesia on the part of  the listener» (Schutz 1996: 253), 
because it is an ideal object independent of  the vehicle that transmits it (ibid.: 247). Music is 
an event of  internal time, «the time within which we grow old, the inner time of  our stream of  
consciousness, is entirely free from elements of  space» (ibid.: 254).
16 Kersten believes that this is a paradox. Being the ideal-typical sociology of  Schutz, it is centered 
on reflection and presents some methodological tools, such as the postulate of  adequacy, which 
permits work on this theme. Like all paradoxes, however, the non-conceptual aspect of  music and 
social relationship is always the starting point and not the final stage of  analysis (Kersten 1976: 64).
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA174
the specious present, this nucleus is a kind of Arianne’s thread that allows the 
orientation towards meaning.
Schutz summarizes some invariant elements of the musical experience. 
First, the experience of music is «in the flux of inner time, in the stream of con-
sciousness. It does not necessarily refer to objects of the outer world» (Schutz 
1996: 260). The external dimension may be required to coordinate the events 
of internal time with spatial events. Schutz writes of appresentative references, 
which are vehicles of meaning, that is to say media that «originated in the sug-
gestions of movements and, first of all, in the movements of the human body, 
which occur simultaneously in both dimensions – the inner durée as well as the 
spatialized time» (ibid.).
Secondly, the music experience is a temporal synthesis that «takes place in 
a specious present which, by means of recollection and expectation, includes 
elements of the past and the future» (ibid.). 
Furthermore the music is experienced as a whole, it is a theme that is con-
figured with gestalt. «The basic element of all music is a unique configuration 
called the theme. It is itself extended in inner time. It is apperceived as a unit 
(Gestalt), or as a combination of those units» (ibid.). The theme may be used, 
repeated, replaced and recur again; it can be combined with other issues or 
with parts or modifications, successive and simultaneous, of the theme itself. 
Despite these modifications, the theme is always experienced as “the same” 
theme (ibid.: 261).
Finally, the author addresses the problem of rhythm which, is not part of 
the musical experience. Rhythm is an ambiguous concept, it refers to physi-
ological events like the heartbeat or breathing, to events in the outside world 
like marching, walking, dancing and «to specific structurizations of our mod-
ern musical ideas (rhythm as a function of harmony)» (ibid.).
Schutz examines a number of basic categories of the musical relationship: 
continuity and repetition, identity, movement.
The first category is the binomial of continuity and repetition. «By way of 
retention the intermittent repetitions of the same tone are brought to coinci-
dence and apperceived as a specious continuance, although actually repeti-
tion of the same occurs» (ibid.: 263). The apperceptive mode is the intuitive 
reference to something different with respect to the present experience (Schutz 
1962: 296), it is the reference to a meaningful relationship. The virtual unity 
is then a sort of “coherence” of sense of the continuous elements in the musi-
cal flow, which are retentively mediated in the apperceptive process. Schutz 
speaks of “virtual coherence”. The repetition, however, «is merely a special 
case of the intermittence of a continuance. It is intermittence of a sameness» 
(Schutz 1996: 263). He notes that when the continuity and repetition refer to 
a functional unity, to themes or «to independent parts of the musical forms. 
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Then they do not originate in pure retention. They are based upon the oth-
er forms of memory; the repetition originates in a synthesis of recognition 
between the reproduced past experience of the theme with its actually ex-
perienced recurrence, and the continuance originates in a fulfillment of the 
previously anticipated development by the actual experience» (Schutz 1996: 
263). With this affirmation Schutz means that retention alone is not sufficient 
for the determination of meaning, reproduction is also necessary through a 
synthesis of recognition which recalls the category of identity.
The second category addressed by Schutz is identity or uniformity, «the 
question of ‘sameness’ is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology» 
(ibid.). It is necessary to distinguish identity from sameness. It has identity when 
you are in front of an object that during the moment of attribution of meaning 
it is changed, because it has been identified as the same object at a different 
point in time than the first. It has sameness, however, when we are faced with 
two different objects that can be distinguished because they are not the same 
object. Schutz gives the example of the repetition of two re notes: they are the 
same note, but interspersed with a break. The second re is different from the 
first re because it is a repeated note that begins after the first is finished. First, 
then, there is a temporal differentiation, «the retention of the actual experience 
of the first tone in its complete development - initial phase, enduring phases, 
end-phase – has been retained when the second tone was actually experienced» 
(ibid.: 264). In the second place, the repetition of the note changes our fund of 
knowledge, albeit imperceptibly; the second re has a different meaning because 
it is placed later in time and thus is no longer the re of before because, again 
imperceptibly, it has also changed the system of relevances of the subject who 
listens. In this sense, «the entry of the second tone certainly adds something 
new to our previous experience. But it is not entirely new, there is no contrast 
between this experience and the previous one, as it was the case when the first» 
re followed a do (ibid.). The interaction of retentions attributed to a re that fol-
lows a re has a different character from that of a re that follows a do. Identity is 
therefore characterized by a change of the internal time of consciousness. «The 
same occurrence, if repeated, is not experienced as strictly the same, it is not 
even experienced as being a like experience. Our mind has changed, infini-
tesimally, but, nevertheless, changed by already having once pre-experienced» 
the re note «in the same context» (ibid.). 
The third category is that of movement17. Schutz explains that the identifi-
cation of the experiences of objects of the external world, in the manipulative 
17  Skarda says Schutz is not very clear in defining this category. The analysis of  the movement 
seems a continuation of  the analysis of  identity. Previously, Schutz had written that the spatial 
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sphere, can take place by means of kinesthetic acts. For example, it is possible 
to see and touch an object, stop the perception, return to seeing and touch-
ing the object, check and see if it is the same or not. Schutz says he has an 
intermittence in the understanding of the object, which implies the abandon-
ment and restoration of the field of experience, and the identification of the 
object as the same object as before. «In the case of visible or tangible objects, 
the synthesis of identification can be verified by releasing it from my field of 
experiencing through the performance of an appropriate kinaesthesia and 
by re-establishing the previous field through the performance of an opposite 
kinaesthesia which undoes the first one. These kinaesthesias interrupted my 
experience of the enduring sameness of the object» (Schutz 1996: 265). It is 
possible to perform the same operation in order to compare the uniformity of 
two objects. For example, to control the length of two objects I can move them 
together and compare them in order to see or touch and determine whether 
they are uniform or not. The same thing does not apply to objects acquired in 
the purely auditory field, like musical objects. Schutz gives the example of the 
sound of a waterfall: if you approach it is possible to hear it, if you move away 
it is no longer possible to hear it. The auditory object, therefore, remains in 
the stream of consciousness even if it is no longer perceived. Schutz writes that 
the knowledge of sound «is based on my knowledge that the object, “cascade”, 
exists and that it has lasted while my experiencing of it was interrupted. It is 
the knowledge of a lasting quality of an external object which is in question» 
(ibid.). In the auditory field, the intermittency of a continuity cannot be at-
tributed to a kinesthetic change that «re-establishes or even verifies sameness. 
Intermittence has not a subjective, but an objective character. The sound, the 
tone itself, has ceased to exist, and another one has started to appear. This 
other one may be like the first but it is, strictly speaking, never the same one» 
(ibid.). In internal time the synthesis of the identification does not presuppose, 
as in external spatialized time, the possibility of comparing, to superimpose 
an object and another. If in space the coexistence of two objects as different 
and separate units is possible, namely sameness is possible, «in the sphere of 
inner time, in the sphere of purely auditory experiences, there is no coexist-
ence. Likeness or sameness refers to succeeding objects; there is not the possi-
bility of looking from one object to the other in order to perform the synthesis 
of identification or of recognition. And, nevertheless, we identify the recurrent 
tone as a tone like the first, or we even say that the same tone has been re-
peated» (ibid.: 266). The author’s conclusion is that in the flow of internal time 
category of  movement, of  kinesthesia, is stranger than internal time, the auditory sphere in 
which the musical experience has a place (Skarda 1979: 73).
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and in the auditory musical sphere, «in the dimension of inner time, or in the 
purely auditory sphere of music, the form of sameness is not that of a numeri-
cal unity but of recurrent likeness; and after this explanation we will use the 
term, “sameness”, exclusively for conveying recurrent likeness [...]» (ibid.).
2.3 Passive synthesis in the experience of music
The recognition of an object of experience, «the synthesis of recognition or 
of identification…is a passive synthesis which does not require any activity of 
our mind» (ibid.), that is to say it does not require a reflective effort. Schutz ad-
dresses three aspects of the problem of passive synthesis in musical experience: 
«a) Sameness and likeness having meanings in the spatial world of visible and 
touchable objects different from those in the world of pure music which has 
its existence merely in the dimension of inner time. b) Within the experience 
of pure music the synthesis of recognition is another one if referred merely to 
recurrent times or to recurrent thematical units. c) It is quite another kind of 
synthesis at work if I recognize musical recurrences when listening to a work 
of music for the first time living within the ongoing flux (or if I re-establish 
such a situation), or if I recognize a piece of music or its thematical elements, 
not being immersed in the ongoing flux but reproducing in my mind music 
with which I am familiar» (ibid.: 268).
The first aspect is related to the irreversibility of internal time, that is the 
basis for describing the difference in meaning between the objects perceived 
in the spatial sphere and those perceived in the sphere of internal time. If the 
objects of the spatial sphere can be caught both monothetically and polytheti-
cally, the objects of internal time can be caught only polythetically. Visual and 
tactile understanding of objects in space can be modified in order to see that 
previously we have had experience of the same object that now has changed 
(Schutz 1996: 266, trans. com. 1996: 72). For example, I can turn back when I 
go the wrong way, I can return to a base point, I can go back to the position of 
familiarity and security that allows me to understand the mistake and maybe 
take the right path. Going back where I was before, I have not encountered 
any spatial obstacle. Consequently, through an monothetic understanding I 
made a comparison between the memory of what happened and what is now. 
This example is a case of what Schutz defines as illusion of passive synthesis 
of overlap. The illusion is in the fact that, from the point of view of the mean-
ing, you can never return to the same point in space time where we were, you 
cannot ever tap into the same flow. The comparison, therefore, can only take 
place after the event and what I’m actually doing is a comparison between the 
memory of the total picture of the experience I had in mind at point in time A 
and the memory of the overall picture of the experience I had at point in time 
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B. These two points, from a spatial perspective, are the same; but from the 
point of view of meaning are the same only after they have been understood, 
which is to say a monothetic understanding through which, with a single 
glance, I canceled the infinite number of changes that have occurred in the 
course of my absence from “home base.” Schutz says: «I grasp the field mono-
thetically by one single ray, and I find that there is a coincidence between 
the actual monothetic experience and the recollection – and the monotheti-
cally recollected, previous one. What gives the illusion of a ‘passive’ synthesis 
is merely the superfluousness of starting over again the polythetic activities 
of our mind in which the monothetic experience of the field has been built 
up» (ibid.: 267). The illusion of passive synthesis disappears when I consider 
my experience in a polythetic manner. Retracing step-by-step the way that I 
traveled from A to B, «if any step actually performed corresponds to like steps 
previously performed and not recollected, and if the actually performed step 
had a sedimentation like the ones recollected, I say that the field re-perceived, 
or the objects re-experienced, are the same or the same, although modified» 
(ibid.). Returning to our example, I can spatially retrace the way I have al-
ready come and ascertain if it is the same way or another. In the spatial sphere 
monothetic recognition is possible because in this sphere one has the freedom 
to return to the basic position and undo the changes that have inevitably oc-
curred in the meantime. Also in the spatial sphere I can achieve polythetic 
recognition, which will be apparent if that what is expected as familiar will 
in fact be different. This double possibility does not apply to objects in the 
temporal sphere, which can only be grasped polythetically. «Objects existing 
merely within the dimension of inner time, merely audible objects and, espe-
cially, musical objects, can only be recognized polythetically» (ibid.).
The second point involves how you have different identification depend-
ing on the reference to the succession of time or on the occurrence of the-
matic unity. In the first case we are completely immersed in the flow of in-
ternal time, we do not have any attitude towards temporal objects. Ours is a 
polythetic experience in the indistinct flow of inner consciousness of time. In 
the second case the identification refers to recurring thematic units. These 
gestalt units are in the basic position that alternates with indistinct flow. 
Schutz refers to the points of flight and rest of William James to explain the 
exit and entry from the flow of internal time. The theme is a sort of key to 
understanding, anchored to the Self, of what is happening. This theme may 
be taken up «any time if I am listening to this symphony or reproducing it 
before my inner ear» (ibid: 268).
The last point is closely related to the previous one. There are two types 
of synthesis, according to which an actor listens to a piece of music for the 
first time or recognizes it then as familiar. When I listen to a musical piece 
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that involves me for the first time, I live in the inner flow of time, I surrender 
to the flow; with the retention and reproduction I can bring out uncontrolla-
bly reflexive thoughts and memories. We are in polythetic indistinct step-by-
step experience, but we are out of the passive synthesis of identification. The 
second type of synthesis is exactly that passive identification. We are in the 
environment of thematic reflection, I can attribute the piece I listen to past 
experiences of functional thematic aspects of the music that is flowing or not.
3 Significant aspects of the relationship between time, music and intersubjectivity
The investigations of Schutz on musical relationship are of great value to the 
social sciences. They allow you to identify a number of problems that are re-
lated to the intersubjective establishment of meaning. I will isolate a number 
of points that should be understood in an ideal-typical way: the synchroniza-
tion of time of the actors, the problem of transition from the polythetic to the 
monothetic, the link between intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience, 
music as a finite province of meaning.
3.1 Synchronization of time of the actors
The first point is related to different modes of synchronization between 
different streams of consciousness of the actors involved in the musical 
relationship.
The constitution of meaning of the musical experience takes place in the 
internal time of consciousness, it is mediated by appresentative references that 
in the world of everyday life take the form of objects made by sounds and 
perceptions of movements. Schutz identifies three ideal-typical subjects in re-
ciprocal interrelations in musical relationship: the listener, the composer and 
the performers18.
The listener is one who grabs a piece of music created by another. He is 
therefore not involved in the construction of the meaning of the same song, 
but is interested in rebuilding the meaning. Goettlich holds in Fragments of 
phenomenology of music that Schutz describes the ways in which the listener be-
comes aware of the “right” meaning of a piece of music (Goettlich 2014: 247). 
18 The analysis of  Schutz concerns opera, but it can also be extended to other types of  musical 
genres. As Goettlich explained, through three ideal-types, the Austrian sociologist showed the 
ways in which, in individual experience, a musical meaning is experienced: «(1) as a listener, 
e.g., sitting in a concert hall or listening to his iPod; (2) as a musician, that is, as member of  an 
ensemble or as a soloist; (3) as a composer» (Goettlich 2014: 246).
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Music is an ideal object that exists independently of physical conditions on 
which it bases its communication, conditions that relate to external time19. 
The listener or beholder20 is linked through the music to a number of mean-
ingful aspects connected to the depth of internal time. These meaningful as-
pects involve the synchronization of internal times both with performers of 
the musical text that interpret the text and with the composer and with the 
other actors who listen to the musical means. The music blends the inner 
experience of the listener with that of other actors in the here and now of 
we-relations listen to a piece of music. In this sense, Mori speaks of music as a 
means of expression of the spontaneity of the human being. Music is a vehicle 
that allows the reciprocal tuning of the actions of the actors. The meaning 
of words is secondary to the musical atmosphere created by the appercep-
tion of sound and rhythm. The musical atmosphere is «intrinsically related 
to the inner life of the public» (Mori 2014: 270). The atmosphere is therefore 
a meaningful intersubjective structure that is conveyed by the music, recall-
ing the primordial world of inner experience of the other. The musical at-
mosphere allows the sharing of meanings between performer and audience, 
although in “quasi-simultaneity”21. Fele observes how a musical composition 
is brought to life, “is embodied” in the relationship between composer and 
beholder, through the exclusive moment «of the use (of the reading, listening, 
execution) through concrete reflective practices during the musical flow» (Fele 
2001: 209). The temporal process of listening to a piece of music brings out 
the role of knowledge as intersubjective communicative skill. These reflective 
skills22 and indexicals give effect to the meaning of the song, actualizing in 
a continuous way and «existing while the sound flow develops» (ibid.: 210). 
Fele emphasizes that the analysis of “endogenous” time of Schutz recalls the 
19 Goettlich highlights how Schutz was interested in the social aspects of  music, how his sci-
entific aim was to analyze the act of  intersubjective understanding mediated by music. For 
this reason, the work of  the Austrian sociologist is an example of  fruitful connections between 
phenomenology and sociology. The author observes that the concept of  music as a backdrop 
given meaning with no conceptual framework is unclear. “Context” is too general a category, 
the term “sound” seems to be more appropriate: «Music is a sound, or a sequence of  sounds, 
provided with meaning. Since the same can be said of  spoken language, one has to further 
clarify: Music is a meaningful sound, but the meaning is not expressed in words» (ibid.: 244).
20 Schutz states that «the term “beholder” will include the executor, the listener, the reader of  
music» (Schutz 1964: 169, trans. com. 1996: 103).
21 The experience of  the “quasi simultaneous” stream of  consciousness of  the mediator and 
the listener is also present when listening via other media such as CDs and videos.
22 It should be noted that the reflexivity mentioned by Fele refers «to the embodied practices 
through which social members produce prospectively and retrospectively courses of  action 
recognizably ordered, explainable, normal, natural» (ibid.).
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“light” moment of ordinary interaction, a moment located inside the context 
from which emerge the experienced meanings23. The internal time connects 
the composer, who is spatio-temporally in a past epoch, to the audience, who 
listen to the music in a “here and now” in a “quasi-simultaneous” way24. The 
author observes that the analyses of Schutz are important because they high-
light how the interaction between composer and performer is a temporal pro-
cess in which the notion of meaning emerges as a procedural constitution to 
investigate step by step. In other words, Schutz demonstrates how meaning is 
radically contextual, «where the context is not a false attribute that “adds” or 
that qualifies a meaning predetermined, autonomous in its definition» (Fele 
2001: 212). It seems that Schutz, in examining how the viewer is bound to the 
composer through internal time, «wants to recover the historical dimension 
(in a macro-sociological and structural sense: the size of the tradition, that had 
been raised by Halbwachs), under the form of a personal interview, continu-
ally present in the music, between the living and the dead» (ibid.: 213-214). 
The ideal type of the composer represents the dimension of the tradition, that 
in Schutz takes the form of a cultural pattern transmitted by the predecessors 
and acquired by members of a social group. According to Goettlich, the typi-
fication of Schutz aims to investigate «the constitution of subjective meaning 
(Sinn) without the construction of objective meaning (Bedeutung) [...]» (Goet-
23 Fele explains how Schutz refutes the idea of  a pre-existing meaning to guarantee mutual 
understanding, and does not agree with the assumption, found in George Herbert Mead, that 
language is the foundation of  social relations. This way of  approaching the problem of  mean-
ing, according to Fele, is exemplary of  Schutz’s refusal to treat the social and musical relation-
ship with a mentalist model; on the contrary, these relationships are non-conceptual forms of  
interaction (Fele 2001: 206). Music is based on a precomunicative relationship in which you 
can live simultaneously with each other in specific time dimensions. In other words, like other 
non-conceptual social relations (for example walking together, dancing, making love, playing 
tennis, etc.), the musical relationship is based on the we-relation. Fele observes how «Schutz [...] 
is not interested in analyzing music in itself, the musical experience or the structure of  sounds, 
but rather to examine the problems that arise» during the realization of  a piece of  music (Fele 
2001: 206).
24 Fele cites Garfinkel, who says that the mutual orientation of  two subjects always involves 
a “minimum consensus” of  normative order to follow in the course of  interaction, implies a 
minimum common denominator. Garfinkel speaks of  this moment as a “full-moment” (fat mo-
ment) «that is to say an interval to be treated as a point. A succession of  such dense moments 
produces the notion of  temporal sequence» (Garfinkel 1952: 146-147). Garfinkel also writes 
that the analysis of  this point in time involves leaving the same time stream, and thus the loss 
of  those time relevancies that define the peculiar sense of  inner time, relevancies that are the 
basis of  the definition of  action. Consequently, «we must look elsewhere, and not in the analysis 
of  the time, the answer to the question arises: where to look for the factors that determine the 
conditions of  regularity of  temporal succession?» (ibid.: 147).
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA182
tlich 2014: 249). The meaning of the music refers to previous experiences and 
reproduction processes, that is to say to a scope of reconstruction of meanings 
already established. The question that is raised here is whether the way of 
establishment of meaning of music is the same for both composer and listener. 
Goettlich says the difference between the mode of use of the meaning expe-
rienced of the music of the composer and the listener is bound to a boundary 
between phenomenology and sociology whose analysis implies an assumption 
of the practice of a composer who is neither empirical nor psychological. To 
specify this peculiarity, Goettlich reflects on the modality of understanding of 
a melody. As we have seen, Schutz says that understanding a melody involves 
the creation of a thematic unit, a “place of rest” in the sense of William James. 
This “place of rest” is a reflexive aspect that is alternated with a “place of 
flight”, which is connected to the indistinct flow of internal time (ibid.: 252). 
The relationship between composer and listener is characterized by the re-
flexive production of a theme, that is to say a gestalt configuration by which 
the music sequence can be apperceived as the “correct” one. It is a process of 
construction and reconstruction which, to an extent and in accordance with 
different modes, also affects the ideal-typical figure of the musician. As for 
the composer, his/her task is not to create a melody out of nothing, because 
if it were so he/she could proceed arbitrarily and compose musical sequences 
that would always be correct. On the contrary his/her task is to give life to 
musical meanings different from those that came before, but linked to the lat-
ter on the basis of a relationship that “inexplicably” is already present in the 
internal flow and must reflexively be brought to light. Goettlich says there are 
two ways to understand the act of composing a musical sequence: the creation 
and the discovery:
On the one hand, it is clear that the composer is creating something new: a 
sequence of  tones played in a specific tempo and with specific phrasing; that is, 
a musical theme which comes into existence in the very moment the composer 
plays it for the first time; it is not there before. On the other hand, in a certain 
sense, the meaningful melody is already there before the composer managed 
to arrange the precise tones in the right sequence. This is suggested by the fact 
that the composer can easily discriminate between those series of  tones which 
are wrong and the one which is right (ibid.: 250-251).
The music, then, is both creation of something totally new, and an ideal 
object that already exists. As one can conceive of a musical theme that already 
exists it’s understood: the composer imagines, in his/her mind, that the theme 
is something that is already there. The same invariant process is followed by 
the performer and the listener, which respectively reproduce with action in 
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the outside world a series of sounds and, in the world of interior meanings, 
a series of meanings connected to sound. Listener, musician-performer and 
composer share an intersubjective appresentative core that remains the same 
on the basis of the principle of the relative insignificance of the vehicle (Schutz 
1962: 302). Goettlich observes how the basis of the significance of a piece of 
music, defined as “existing” or “already there”, will be the experience of the 
theme, and not some prior ontological existence (Goettlich 2014: 251).
The ideal type of the musician refers to an individual who plays alone or in 
a group a score written by himself or by someone else. Goettlich explains that 
Schutz is talking about an expert musician who performs a piece according 
to standards of correctness, and not a musician who improvises or a beginner 
who wants to improve their skills. If you also consider the relationship with 
the listener, you could speak of a triple correlation, in which the player acts as 
a mediator between composer and listener. The central aspect of the figure 
of the musician is to be the central pivot of articulation of the foundational 
dimension of the we-relation. The musician assumes the relationship of mutual 
harmony, that is, a relationship in which you have the fusion of the flows of 
the experience of people who “grow up and grow old together in the vivid 
present”. This applies both to the members of an orchestra, who make music 
together in the here and now of we-relation, and for the relationship between 
composer and performer, outside the we-relation, because they live in different 
eras. The reason for this view is that the “mutual self harmony in relation” 
has as a reference the internal time and not the external one. Consequently, 
even if the relationship between composer and performer derived from the 
face to face relationship, derived from the “outer” meeting space, it is in any 
case based on elements of the “internal” experience that can not be separated 
by the sedimentation of past subjective experiences. The creation of a piece of 
music and the musician’s interpretation of the composer’s opera comes “step-
by-step”, in a polythetic way. The polythetic process of the constitution of 
meaning makes the sharing by two individuals of the same or different exter-
nal times irrelevant. The crucial point is that the partners, living through the 
same process, establish the simultaneity between their streams of conscious-
ness; the sharing of internal time is more important, for Schutz,  than the 
fact that making music together is also an event of external time. Goettlich 
repeats the central thesis of Schutz’s view that «this sharing of the other’s flux 
of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, 
constitutes what we called [...] the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experi-
ence of the “We”, which is at the foundation of all possible communication» 
(Schutz 1964: 173). Fele focuses his attention on the process of the “step-by-
step” setting up that invests time synchronization of experience between the 
musician and the composer. For the performer of a song the musical score is 
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not an self-explanatory instruction packet, but a set of meanings necessar-
ily vague and open to different interpretations. As for all instructions from 
the world of everyday life, the Austrian sociologist believes that an interpre-
tive work of “closure” of the musical text is necessary. This work of closure, 
continues Fele, was held in accordance with located “social determinants”: 
«tempo, dynamics, and expression, or directions as to the connection with 
other sounds (by such devices as ties, slurs, and the like)» (Schutz 1964: 166). 
In this context, therefore, the closure of musical text takes place in accordance 
with non-formalized practices of the performer, which emerge as the imposed 
relevances of the context of interaction. The radical context of meaning, ac-
cording to Fele, highlights the constructivist matrix, intersubjective and radi-
cally contextual of the investigations of Schutz; the musical experience «is not 
based on the survival of individual interpretations of disembodied documents 
such as written scores (or even on a set of informal interpretive traditions), but 
on the continuing review of the experience again, each time, that piece of mu-
sic in its individuality» (Fele 2001: 209)25. Furthermore, the central element 
of the connection between internal and external time of most performers of 
a piece of music that play together is the externalization of social interaction 
«in a concrete and visible shared space» (ibid.: 215). Through the procedural 
explication, step by step, of the spatial sharing of the stream of consciousness 
of the other, by means of mutual bodily movements, Schutz «overcomes a 
purely private and interior model of musical use to establish the very conditions 
of intersubjectivity» (ibid.).
3.2 Transition from polythetic to monothetic 
The musical experience has a non-conceptual structure. This aspect raises a 
number of problems associated to the central assertion of Schutz according 
to whom the meaning emerges in the predicative sphere, although it has its 
roots in the prepredicative sphere of consciousness. The polythetic character 
of musical experience and its connection to monothetic understanding is one 
aspect of this issue. First of all, the difficulty of rendering logically coher-
25 Fele emphasizes that the aim of  Schutz is to understand «what happens in the effective per-
formance of  a musical piece» (Fele 2001: 209). In this sense, the critique of  Costolloe of  the 
idea of  meaning of  the Austrian sociologist as an exclusively private matter (Costolloe 1994) 
misses the central aspect of  his analysis: the social relationship between a listener and a com-
poser, who share a wealth of  typical knowledge, radically social, that emerge interactively and 
simultaneously through the musical experience. The viewer synchronizes the internal time with 
the composer through a “semiotic-textual” legacy (Fele 2001: 214), that is, by means of  a score 
played by the performer.
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ent the translation of meaning from an unreflective field to a reflective field 
emerges. Furthermore, there is the fundamental problem of awareness and 
knowledge of the Self. Finally, there is the methodological problem connected 
to the background of the construction of the idealtype.
Sebald says there are two ways of dealing with the “pseudo paradox”26 
between polythetic and monothetic. The first method is that derived from 
the elaboration of the theory of William James’ succession of transitive and 
substantive phases in consciousness. Schutz considers conscious reflection that 
unifies the object of experience a “resting point”, while the indistinct succes-
sion of “points of flight” to be not immediately conscious. The second method, 
however, recalls the stream of consciousness that seems to be triggered and 
addressed by external events as in the articulation of musical phrasing (Schutz 
1996: 274-275). In other words, the musical experience is an imposed rel-
evance that brings out “step-by-step” cognitive aspects which are contextually 
relevant. 
Goettlich and Mori tend to interpret the relationship between polythetic 
flow and monothetic experience in the first sense. Sebald, Fele and Stascheit 
are closer to the second perspective. 
According to Goettlich, the reconstruction of the meaning of music needs 
the understanding of the polythetic flow of the meanings of a piece of music, 
but implies monothetic reflection on the entire experience. Goettlich observes 
how the alternation between polythetic and monothetic actually signals that 
the listener is able to understand the music during his listening only through 
the use of “themes” or musical units that imply “a sense of virtual purpose”. A 
sequence of tones is experienced as a melody if it puts the viewer in a state of 
mind in which one can stop look back at oneself and attribute meaning. This 
recalls the importance of the alternation of “places of rest and flight” from the 
theory of William James. Mori retains that the distinction between polythetic 
and monothetic signals a differentiation between orders of consciousness. The 
problem faced by Mori is the phenomenological representation of the inner 
life of consciousness. The author affirms that we can consider music a solitary 
art through which it is possible to spontaneously express one’s Self. For exam-
ple, the technological supports are vehicles through which, alone, the actors 
can listen to their favorite music. In this sense, the use of musical experience as 
artistic experience is a spontaneous activity in the world of everyday life that 
enables us to reflect on the relationship between the structure of conscious-
26 Notably, this paradox is present in the world of  science, in the world of  constructs of  the 
second degree, not in the constructs of  the first degree of  everyday life, in which the experience 
of  music and interaction with others are taken for granted, are “data of  the natural attitude.”
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ness and intersubjectivity. Music is an event of internal time that mediates 
between the various expressions of the mental life of others (Mori 2014: 271). 
Mori picks up Schutz’s distinction between internal time and external time, 
considering the first a spiraling and indistinct time and the second to be lin-
ear. The descriptions of Bergson discuss a cone of light, of Husserl who draws 
a triangle, and of Schutz who elaborates in a more complex way the triangle 
of Husserl, are metaphors that seek to significantly order polythetic internal 
experiences that are increasingly difficult to express. The Japanese sociologist 
places emphasis on how the linearity of the flow of consciousness is a meta-
phor that aims to monothetically simplify the complex process of sedimenta-
tion of knowledge in the memory27. The difference between the polythetic and 
monothetic structure of Schutz can be seen as mirroring the contrast between 
two temporal orders. Mori writes of polithetically synthesized order and 
monothetically synthesized order. The polythetic order is the interconnec-
tion between exclusively graspable perceptual experiences as a complex. The 
monothetic order, however, is the linear order. Schutz reworks the idea of 
polythetic flow and of monothetic understanding as a function of the concepts 
of simultaneity and quasi-simultaneity between two people (ibid.). Music is 
a polythetic flow of the internal consciousness of more people that acts as a 
vehicle of meanings.
The second solution, which seems more innovative, opens up new perspec-
tives on the role of the body as mediator between internal time and external-
space time. It should be emphasized that Schutz expressly denies that the spa-
tial experience can be the origin of the musical experience. Even rhythm is an 
experience that has its origin in internal time. Nevertheless, Sebald28 argues 
that Schutz’s theory can be reorganized in a coherent manner as occurrence 
of internal time confined to bodily movements. The structural opening of the 
phenomenological machinery of Schutz allows a harmonious integration of 
the relationship between internal time, consciousness, and external time, un-
derstood as corporeal sphere, as the basis for developing a theory of emotions 
(ibid.: 15). Fele is of the same opinion, who states that the role of public space 
and external time, understood as a «concrete physical place where music is 
shared» (Fele 2001: 215) is fundamental because the face-to-face relationship 
27 «A perception, namely a perceptively lived experience, can be positioned as a distinction. 
Therefore, a perception can entail distinct differences. However, whether these positioned 
points can be put onto the same straight line or not, is dependent on each view point, from 
which man pays attention to something intended» (ibid.: 272).
28 Sebald poses a series of  problems: the non-conceptual structure of  meaning, the problem of  
passive synthesis, the phenomenological concept of  ideal object, the problem of  thematic units, 
the connection of  body, mind and space (Sebald 2013: 11).
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can emerge, understood as the mutual physical presence of other bodies in the 
present experience. The bodies of the performers of a musical piece become an 
additional score from that of the semiotic-textual composer. The interaction 
of gestures between performers is unthinkingly assumed as a set of commands 
that guide the mutual behavior. Fele writes: «Schutz in this way is transported 
into the open, to the surface of social relations, as embodied scenic features, 
those conditions of possibility of sharing a stream of activities that were previ-
ously hidden: they are no longer confined within the consciousness, as events 
of internal time, but they see the light in the concrete interaction with my di-
rect interlocutors in the flesh in front of me» (ibid.: 215-216). Fele accentuates 
the importance of the mutual physical presence in communication, rework-
ing the idea of Schutz according to which the knowledgeable communicative 
intent is not always present. The musical relationship is an example: «The 
Other’s facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short 
all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped 
by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative in-
tent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the Other 
is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own 
behavior» (Schutz 1964: 176). Fele stresses that Schutz was one of the first 
sociologists from which Garfinkel was inspired to investigate communication 
as a procedure located in a “here and now” that is linked to the external time 
of interaction. Schutz «laid the foundations of a sociology of interaction, in 
which the body takes on a significant value. No longer are the intentions or 
the will that determine the communication: the processes of communication 
no longer take place in the recesses of consciousness, but relate primarily to 
the presence of at least two persons» (Fele 2001: 217). Fele cites the analysis of 
Schutz of the steps constituting the process of construction of meanings that 
are «a little gem of a study of social interaction» (Fele 2001)29. The investiga-
29 Fele’s use of  Schutz to explain some aspects of  the vision of  Garfinkel is a great example of  
how to confront the theoretical between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology 
in a balanced way. Fele is very diplomatic in his elaboration of  the themes of  the empirically 
intersubjective experiences of  making music together. This in light of  a series of  unbridgeable 
distances between instances of  postanalytical ethnomethodology and those of  comprehensive 
sociology: one among many is the underestimation of  the subject in ethnomethodology and 
the importance of  memory and internal time in comprehensive sociology. The ethnometh-
odological interpretation made by Fele of  Schutz can be understood as a methodologically 
interesting extension that, nevertheless leaves open many questions. Chief  among these issues 
is the relationship between the internal time of  consciousness and spatialized external time. In 
ethnomethodology there is a substantial elimination of  internal time and a reduction of  social 
relations to external time, spatially located contexts (see Rawls 2015). According to Schutz, al-
though the body, with its symptoms of  expression, is the element of  mediation between internal 
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tion on the processes of coordination between social actors in “the flesh” and 
the relationship between the internal and external time of Schutz are an ex-
ample of ethnomethodological “respecification” of traditional objects of con-
ventional sociology, in order to «penetrate into the practices that constitute a 
culture, trying to return from inside the same logic that participants adopt to 
make their conduct, in the same moment in which they are mutually related 
to each other, coherent and sensible» (ibid.: 218-219)30.
According to Michael Stascheit, monothetic reconstruction of meaning re-
fers to a context of objects, not a monothetically synthesized single element. 
He retains that the interpretation of musical experience as a relationship giv-
en meaning that doesn’t have a conceptual framework of reference leads to 
the core problem of the hermeneutic interpretation (Stascheit 2014: 121). The 
hermeneutic circle recalls the problem of the prepredicative dimension and 
extra-linguistic meaning. This theme is a real challenge of Western thought: 
the author speaks of borderline experience. The experience of the hermeneu-
tic circle is connected to sociability and its many forms. The most radical form 
of sociability is the experience of the “we-relation”. From the empirical point 
of view all social relations are experiences of time objects that have a polythet-
ic structure, they flow in the consciousness of internal time. The problem of 
Stascheit is coherence between the polythetic and monothetic plane of distinct 
streams of experience. The meaning of the experience of temporal objects is 
contained mainly in the polythetic structure of the elements present in the 
consciousness of time (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 53). In order to grasp the 
time and external time or space, he is also drastic in the assertion that the spatial and rhythmic 
element is not the origin of  the musical experience and is irrelevant (Schutz 1996: 253-254).
30 Although many ethnomethodological studies can be considered an empirical application of  
the theories of  Schutz on the musical relationship, «it should be emphasized, however, that eth-
nomethodology is not interested at all in issues of  internal time, but considers social interaction 
as theatrical devices that are publicly available» (Fele 2001: 219). According to Fele, one of  the 
nuclei of  ethnomethodological analysis is in the four-page essay on comunicative relations in 
the outside world that Schutz intended to pick up again and develop. The analysis of  the heirs 
of  Garfinkel seems to be of  a different opinion however. Anne W. Rawls, Michael Lynch and 
Wes Sharrock, for example, have repeatedly stressed the dissonances rather than the similarities 
between the vision of  Schutz and Garfinkel. This was well demonstrated by Alex Dennis in a 
lively debate with Lynch and Sharrock, the latest interpretations of  postanalytical ethnometh-
odology equated Schutz to a kind of  scientist that would separate the world of  science and the 
world of  common sense. Because of  this view, the thought of  the Austrian sociologist would be 
an obstacle to the attempts of  Garfinkel to empirically analyze the world of  daily life. It should 
be emphasized that between phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology there are 
even some stark differences, but it is equally true that the elimination of  Schutz by the authors 
to better understand the ethnomethodological movement is a misinterpretation that produces 
only a loss to the same ethnomethodology (Dennis 2004).
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meaning of the experience of a temporal object the subject must complete in 
a reflexive way the polythetic constitution of that experience. The problem is 
that the sharing of monothetic transformation is problematic. The solution of 
Stascheit is found in the presupposition of a common level of physical atten-
tion rooted and expressed in the relative tension of the bodies. The perception 
of the body is the vehicle of the synchronization of time of the experiences 
between subjects who are involved in the musical flow. The intensity of the 
tension between the bodies is the temporal measure that is experienced as 
a succession of steps of mutual attention. The author speaks of a number of 
stages of the musical experience. The first level is that of listening to music as it 
usually is found in the world of everyday life, a mode that we can define as na-
ive. It has a low tension of consciousness, the musical experience is presented 
in an indistinct way. This naive mode of the undifferentiated flow of music 
is defined as mode of resonance. The second level is the intentional mode: it 
has a greater attention which commits the subject to perceive sounds related 
to a focal moment of the musical experience, a moment connected to the con-
tinuous co-presence of the musical flow. Finally, there is the co-performative 
mode, in which listening is focused on a part of the musical flow and is direct-
ed towards the future (Stascheit 2014: 117). The demarcation of these three 
levels makes it possible to clarify the problem of the “independence of hands”, 
that is to say the problem of how the junction between body movements and 
the polythetic musical flow come about. In this case, the medium that allows 
simultaneous access to the experience of polyphony, coherently maintaining 
the pace of hand movement, is the piano (ibid.: 115)31.
31 The analysis of  Stascheit is articulated by the theoretical systems of  Bergson and Merleau-
Ponty, translating the appresentation of  Schutz into an intersubjective field theory, of  a gestalt 
matrix, that seems to oversimplify the relationship between experience, intersubjectivity, music 
and the body. The result is a kind of  Okkam’s razor centered on the theme of  “incarnation” 
of  meanings. Consequently, Stascheit develops the problem of  the hermeneutic circle in a vi-
sion that emphasizes the non-conceptual nature of  the intersubjective relationship. This is in 
contradiction with the central aspects of  the vision of  Schutz, which is divided on the primacy 
of  the selection. For the Austrian sociologist the hermeneutical circle is certainly present in the 
form of  a link between appresentative reference and totality of  experience. It is equally correct 
to say that this recalls some gestalt aspects, integrating them with concepts of  pragmatism - as 
the idea of  points of  flight and rest in James. Nevertheless, his perspective is linked to that of  
a reflexively oriented subject (a “weak” subject), even if  a non-Cartesian one. In other words, 
the vision of  Schutz is essentially noetic. Schutz has always had strong reservations about the 
theory of  the field of  gestalt matrix. For a long time he debated vigorously against the attempts 
of  his friend Aron Gurwitsch to eliminate the idea of  the subject (see Schutz, Gurwitsch 1989, 
Sacchetti 2010). On the contrary, Stascheit seems to help the noematic dimension prevail, 
emphasizing the holistic aspect of  the lack of  reflection and of  the perception of  the body. The 
danger of  this operation is to eliminate key aspects like the theme of  meaning understood and 
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3.3 Intersubjectivity and immediacy of experience
The musical relationship is an empirical example of sharing of prelinguistic 
meanings within the field of the “we-relation”: it has the union of streams of 
consciousness and the establishment of a “common We” which is the basis of the 
“grow together” in the specious present. This idea involves crossing the classic 
Cartesian distinction between internal and external knowledge and also forms 
the basis of the conception of the socio-centric meaning of Schutz. The idea that 
intersubjectivity is a given in the world of natural attitude and its articulation 
through the theory of signs and symbols has been the object of several criti-
cisms.32 The latter is of particular importance to Zaner who criticizes the idea of 
“mutual tuning-in relationship”, the basis of the “we-relation” and constitutive 
aspect of the musical relationship. In summary, Zaner argues that Schutz ar-
ticulates intersubjectivity in a Cartesian manner by treating it the same way as 
a kind of interior that would emerge in relationship with the Other. Because the 
interior is accessible only to the subject, it would spring from an elusive symbolic 
interpretation in communication and is therefore meaningless. In addition, the 
author evaluates the theory of problematic appresentazione because it does not 
permit understanding of how one can catch the Other. Finally, he sustains that 
the notion of the Other as a given in the world of everyday life is incomprehen-
sible. The “we-relation” is a enigmatic concept (Zaner 2002).
One of the clearer responses to Zaner’s observations is that of Belvedere, 
which can be summarized in three points: first, intersubjectivity emerges 
through mutual reflection in the world of everyday life; second, the appre-
sentation of the other implies the empirical perception of a body that is con-
stitutively experienced as a set of meanings; and lastly, the other is a given in 
the world of daily life because, in this context, he/she is an immediate and 
indubitable manifestation.
The first point is placed within the now classic critique of psychology that is 
leveled, by different authors at different times, at phenomenology and specifi-
cally at Schutz33. The development of the theory of language by Luckmann, 
of  reflection, the problem of  the relationship between individual experience, musical experi-
ence and system of  relevances.
32 For a detailed analysis of  the critiques of  the idea of  intersubjectivity of  Schutz see Muzzetto 
(Muzzetto 1997).
33 A paradigmatic example is represented by the arguments of  Gorman (Gorman 1977). He 
charges Schutz of  moving himself  from a psychologist’s perspective, without explaining the 
meaning of  intersubjectivity and, in fact, placing himself  within the category of  naive realism.
Not to be missed, the biting work of  Edward G. Armstrong, who believes there is a general 
trend of  “anti-phenomenological” thought – a sort of  “phenomenologofobia” – accuses phe-
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as articulated by the encounter with the other that is captured as the body 
conveys appresentativamente meanings, is a fruitful example of radically em-
pirical co-construction of meanings themselves. The appresentative under-
standing of meaning is “direct” because it takes place in a situation of face to 
face interaction in which one has the “mirroring” of the Self in another Self 
and vice versa. With mirroring one has the attribution of subjective mean-
ing to that which has been caught by an interpretative scheme (Luckmann 
1983: 83)34. Belvedere shows how the reflection has a perceptive basis given by 
synchronization between elements of internal time and external events. This 
perceptive basis is present in every intersubjective relationship and forms the 
core of the “theory of the existence of the alter ego”.
Secondly, Zaner says that the theory of appresentation of Schutz is ob-
scure. Actually Schutz and Luckmann well explain the analytical steps of 
the perception of the other starting from the process of passive synthesis. The 
body of the other, with all its expressive symptoms, immediately recalls the 
idea of being human that Schutz calls “my fellow”. The other is caught, first, 
in an immediate way, with an appresentative perceptive synthesis; only in a 
second moment have you the reflexive categorization35. Schutz’s theory of im-
nomenologists like Schutz of  being psychologists and solipsists. The “phenomenologofobes”, 
evoking the solipsism as a common sense term, do not address the philosophical problem of  
the minds of  others. In fact they face solipsism from a solipsistic point of  view. Armstrong 
finds irony in this position, which would mask a «last line of  defense against the terrors of  the 
unknown» (Armstrong 1979: 68).
34 Luckmann summarizes the relationship between theory of  appresentation and meaning in 
the following points. 1) When two details are both present in the unity of  perception and are 
characterized by the transfer of  meaning (inference by analogy), then we are faced with as-
sociative coupling. In this relationship A, which is present, is associated with B, which is also 
present. 2) When two details, one present, the other absent, are characterized by analog trans-
fer of  meaning, then we are faced with appresentative coupling. In this relationship A, which is 
present, appresenta B, which is not present. 3) When two details, one present, the other absent, 
are characterized by the theming of  that which is absent through that which is present, then 
we are facing meaningful coupling (reflexive). In this relationship A, which is present, means 
B, which is not present. There is a relationship at increasingly complex levels that involves the 
following elements. 1) The flow of  consciousness, 2) the passive syntheses, 3) the thematisation, 
4) the activation of  the ego through the attention, 5) experience 6) the reflexive outlet (the re-
turn to experience), 7 ) the significance of  the experience, 8) the project, 9) the project directed 
towards the alter ego, 10) social action (Luckmann 1983: 77-78).
35 Belvedere points out that «one of  Schutz’s main contributions on the subject is (regardless of  
Zaner’s criticisms) to reveal that intersubjectivity relies on my perception of  the other’s body medi-
ated by signs and objects of  the outer world, ie, that there is no perception of  his inner time flow in-
volved in intersubjectivity, even though I can experience the same flux of  experience as others, not 
by grasping it through empathy but reproducing it on my own by a synchronization of  our fluxes 
of  experiences mediated by a pre-conceptual kind of  ‘communication.’ Put otherwise, I do not 
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mediate perception of the other (i.e. appresentation in the world of everyday 
life), according to Belvedere is the foundation of empirical certainty of the 
existence of the other (certainty, however, that is “always subjected to contrary 
evidence”)36. This means that the other is grasped within a pre-conceptual 
level on the basis of body language. This prelinguistic level is the basis of the 
entire intersubjective relationship and is based on an attitude that has to go 
beyond the limitations of positivism, whether by vulgar empiricism or sensible 
intuition. Schutz’s settings offer us a model that allows «a profound and mul-
tifaceted description including not only sensorial data but also, and particu-
larly, the types and categories that shape our perception of things» (ibid.: 226).
Finally, Belvedere clarifies the steps of Schutz’s theory of alter ego that Zan-
er found confused. Intersubjectivity theory articulates the idea that «the other 
is constituted in a passive synthesis of our minds; thus, our knowledge of the 
other is not the product of our active reflective grasp but it is imposed on our 
perception in a compelling and indubitable way» (ibid.). The other is a given 
in the world of life intending it as a body through which, in a pre-reflective 
way, «I can start a social relationship. Thus, the given of the Other is not the 
appresentation of his inner stream of consciousness but his bodily signs, per-
fectly presented to my perception and which work along with mine in a pre-
linguistic ‘conversation’» (ibid.).
3.4 Music as a finite province of meaning 
Music separates the reality of the art world from the world of everyday life 
(Schutz 1964: 197), the language that accompanies music refers to relevances 
reproduce other’s experiences: I produce my own, in a similar by way means of  communication 
mediated by signs, living in a We-relationship while growing older together» (Belvedere 2014: 225). 
Belvedere continues: «Although Schutz does not say so, we could think of  this as a non-intentional 
bond to the Other given that - just as Zaner argues - in Schutz’s position the only intentional rela-
tionship is between my noesis and my noema – i.e., there is no intentional relationship between my 
noesis and the other’s. So one could say that I do not experience the flux of  experience of  the other 
but I do experience the same as him, not only in his duree but in mine. Consequently, perception is 
a good enough fundament for stating intersubjectivity in the framework of  a phenomenology of  
the natural attitude, which means that no empathy is needed» (ibid.).
36 According to Belvedere, «for transcendental phenomenology, this kind of  attachment to per-
ception would give us no more than a subjective and relative experience and would lead us to 
reject philosophical certainty and remain in skepticism. On the contrary, for Schutz (and the 
author), perception is the ultimate fundament of  all certainty. Our claim here is not to drop 
back into relativism and skepticism but setting universalism on different grounds arguing that 
all certainty comes from the natural attitude, which shall be described not as mere subjective 
and relative but – in “thick description” – as objective and absolute» (Belvedere 2014: 225-226).
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(Schutz, 1996: 245) and to reordered symbolic meanings at almost infinite 
levels (Schutz 1964: 187). The analysis of alternation between musical melody 
and rhythm as the basis of the passage between orders of reality is an example 
of how «music expresses and creates spontaneously ordered lived experiences 
which are composed of sensory perceptions and bodily movements» (Mori 
2014: 273). According to Mori, melody, harmony and rhythm are three musi-
cal elements of the constitution of a configuration of meaning articulated in 
time. In the same mode as intervals of perception of the sounds of one’s body 
(for example heartbeat, pulse, respiration and step), the musical experience is 
a lived experience which constitutes a primordial rhythm based on a subjec-
tive axis and temporal primary present in the mind of every individual (ibid.). 
The melody is closely linked to this axis of time, because it is an element of 
the perception not objectively definable: once created it disappears from the 
flux of experience. Similar to harmony, when combined in various ordina-
tive shades of the experience, the melody is a set of meanings perceived in 
a unified way. The rhythm, however, is nothing more than a division of the 
melody in the field of space and time. Rhythm is caught through a perception 
experienced in the form of intervals that are followed and distributed back 
into a melodic flow. The function of mediation between orders of reality of 
melody and rhythm can be exemplified by the role of language. The sound of 
the words and the rhythmic accompaniment of body movements are the basis 
of the transition from a time dimension to a spatial dimension. The sound 
of language invokes a mutual duality: on the one hand, it has a conceptual 
meaning inherent in words; on the other, the sound of the speaker’s voice or 
song is similar to a melody that conveys meanings that transcend the cogni-
tive and conceptual aspect. The voice becomes a vehicle for mediation of 
emotions that you express through words. Put differently, the cognitive order 
mediated by the sound of words is always linked to other aspects that recall 
different symbolic orders. Music has a meta-trascendental specificity «which 
is a priori creating and coordinating an order of lived experiences, depends 
very strongly on an experienced duality of rhythm» (ibid.: 275).
Another aspect is the problem of understanding the specific difference be-
tween sound and music. The use of the theory of signs and symbols of Schutz 
can distinguish three possible types of meanings of music: an indicative mean-
ing, an emblematic meaning and a symbolic meaning. The latter meanings 
are related, respectively, to small, medium and large transcendences.
In the first case, music is understood as an indication, overcoming so-called 
“Small Transcendencies”; in the second case as a sign, overcoming so-called 
“Medium Transcendencies”; in the third case as a symbol, overcoming so-
called “Great Transcendencies”. According to the “Principle of  the Relative 
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Irrelevance of  the Vehicle” [...], music may be used as an indication as well as 
a sign or a symbol” (Goettlich 2014: 245).
Music is a means of overcoming a small transcendence when it is used as 
an index, for example, like the sound of an alarm clock that reminds you of the 
time when you have to wake up. Obviously, this is not the meaning of the mu-
sic Schutz intended, but it is a sort of “indebted appropriation” of the intrinsic 
end of music. The indicative meaning of music is derived and does not furnish 
distinctive criteria with respect to sound. The emblematic or symbolic meaning 
of a musical expression tells me something of my interlocutor, for example, the 
sound of teeth grinding can suggest to me information about his mental state. As 
Goettlich explains, the more comprehensive distinction between mere sounds 
and music is to be found in the third sense, relative to the symbolic meaning.
Music, in opposition to mere sounds, has the capability to overcome a “Great 
transcendency”. In other words, music is an acoustic phenomenon occurring 
within the paramount reality and referring – at least potentially – to a transcen-
dent sphere of  reality, that is, the world of  arts. It is this third potential meaning 
which distinguishes music from mere sounds” (ibid.).
Conclusions
According to Schutz, the inner consciousness of time is an indispensable uni-
versal structural basis of all the processes of the attribution of meaning. I 
agree with Skarda when he maintains that the Austrian sociologist examines 
the problem of music with an emphasis on how the acoustic field of the spatial 
sphere depends on a temporal structure that may remain implied, but that is 
methodologically essential. This structure recalls the knowledge sedimented 
in the past37. Among the egological and internal temporal dimensions there is 
a indissoluble link. To eliminate the internal time dimension means to elimi-
37 Skarda writes: «Emphasis should be placed on the word ‘spatial’ here. Although Schutz does 
not, in this quotation, specify that he is speaking of  the absence of  spatial structure, I believe 
that is what he intended. To be sure, there is structure in the acoustic field, but it is temporal not 
spatial. For example, if  there is depth in acoustic experience then it is the experience of  tempo-
ral depth, i.e., the past, that is meant» (Skarda 1979: 99). Pedone is of  the opposite view, who 
claims that this thesis is unfounded, «for the lack of  an explicit consideration of  the symbolic 
processes that come into play when listening» (Pedone 1996: 20). The observations of  Skarda 
are a stimulus for further reflection on the centrality of  the egological dimension, of  that sym-
bolic and that of  constitution of  meanings that can not be developed here.
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nate the dimension of subjectivity and the intended meaning. The sociology of 
Schutz is noetic, it is radically anchored to an entity that continuously recon-
figures the meanings as a function of systems of relevance that emerge from 
time to time in the multiple fields of experience. One can parenthesize the in-
ternal temporality, for methodological purposes (for example in dealing with 
the musical rhythm and the dimension of the body), but always bearing in 
mind that the reflective dimension, linked to the Self, cannot be eliminated.
The egological dimension recalls the theory of appresentazione, the theme 
of music as a finite province of meaning and that of the relationship between 
individual and collective dimensions of meaning. The musical relationship 
is an example of “we-relation”, in which it has a fusion with the others in a 
symbolic “We” in which the appresentative is the common situation and the 
appresented is the participation in a world of ideal categorizations. Music is 
thus a relationship that expresses in a non-conceptual way symbolic aspects 
that can form the basis of an infinite chain of appresentative relationships38. 
Among these symbolic aspects those related to intersubjectivity are nodal. 
The musical relationship therefore constitutes a potential vehicle of union be-
tween individual center and social center of the constitution of meaning39.
In Schutz the attribution of meaning is always based on emergencies of 
the “here and now.” These emergencies are a sum of imposed and intrinsic 
relevances, and are never defined a priori. The voluntarism or passivity, the 
reflexivity and the irreflexivity are methodological hypotheses not likely to 
be of clear demarcation. In the world of everyday life, the realization of a 
project cannot be subjected to a control system that can bring into being clear 
dividing lines between intrinsic or imposed relevances, between reflective or 
irreflective aspects. Only if the actor could master all the total connections of 
their experiences past, present and future, and all possible combinations be-
tween these links might one arrive at a precise demarcation. This hypothesis 
of hyper-rationality, however, would be a metaphysical hypothesis40.
38 Schutz explains how, for example, Kierkegaard uses the work of  Mozart as a symbol which is 
the starting point of  a symbolization of  different degree. Specifically, Kierkegaard contrasts the 
immediacy of  the music, connected to an aesthetic-erotic plane, the reflection of  the language, 
connected to the ethical plane (Schutz 1964).
39 According to Schutz, in the works of  Mozart the characters are ideal-types that express uni-
versal feelings. These feelings are developed intersubjectively through action, highlighting as-
pects linked to the interior life and to personality. In the works of  Mozart, musically, an atmos-
phere is created that characterizes the social climate; more people express their individuality 
in a unified manner, making the complexity typical of  the experience clear to the public. In 
other words, the multi-dimensionality typical of  social situations is created (Schutz 1964: 199).
40 Awareness of  the impossibility of  accurately controlling the context of  future predictions is 
an epistemological hinge of  the antipositivist thought of  the author. In the essay on Tiresias, 
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The anthropological model of Schutz shows how internal time is the key and 
uneliminable element in the process of attribution of meaning and intersubjec-
tive constitution of reality. The division between internal and external time 
of Schutz is not similar to the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res 
extensa, but it is a heuristic distinction which aims to clarify the phenomenon 
being studied, which stands out from the idea of intentionality of consciousness. 
In this view, time and intentionality are analytical elements inevitably subordi-
nate to common inter-subjective time. The problematics of the nonconceptual 
aspects of the musical experience and of intersubjectivity is a way to conjugate 
the relationship between the process of polythetic construction and monothetic 
synthesis. The intersubjective coconstruction of meaning always implies a ten-
sion between related areas that entail, for example, subjective and intersubjec-
tive experience, language (constructs of first and second degree), finite provinces 
of meaning (the world of everyday life and symbolic worlds).
Notwithstanding the analysis of Schutz on the musical experience being 
but an outline, the depth and richness of his reflections are still unsurpassed. 
The openness with which the sociologist articulates the meaningful themes of 
the relationship between intersubjective time and musical relationship can be 
exemplified in two non-mutually exclusive points. The first point is the notion 
of musical relationship as “step-by-step” co-construction of meanings, that 
has been the area of origin of a series of empirical studies on the located con-
struction of meaning. As Fele explained, Harold Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967) 
took cues from essential surveys of Schutz on the interaction of experiences 
in musical experience, on the temporal relationship and intersubjectivity. The 
father of ethnomethodology, with the appropriate differentiation, then em-
pirically developed part of the assumptions of Schutz, attempting to make a 
connection on the side of taken for granted. Aaron Cicourel (Cicourel 1964; 
1973) was another author who, on the one hand, developed in a critical key 
the problem of Verstehen by applying the methodology of empirical research, 
and on the other, reorganized the study of temporal processes of interaction 
and procedural practices with which the actors attribute meaning, in an em-
pirical key consistent with the assumptions of Schutz. The second point is that 
Schutz applies that principle to the relationship between time, forecasting in the world of  eve-
ryday life and the assumption of  risk that that particular prediction will be wrong (cf.. Schutz 
1964). The view of  the Austrian sociologist not dissimilar to the wholism of  Pierre Duhen, 
which, in physics, explained how one «can never submit an isolated hypothesis to experience, 
but only a whole set of  hypotheses. When the experience is in disagreement with his predic-
tions, it [...] teaches that at least one of  the assumptions constituting the set is unacceptable and 
should be modified, but does not [...] indicate which must be changed» (Duhem 1906, trans. 
en. 1978: 211).
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of the link with the social construction of meanings and connections with the 
social structure. As Mori explained, the scope of music is connected to an 
intersubjective structure of meanings mediated symbolically, that go beyond 
the situationality of the context or subjective goals. Through the linguistic 
experience – for example, the tone, the pauses, the volume of the sound of the 
words – appresentatively called and created meanings that have a spectrum 
of almost infinite shades. With this in mind, Luckmann proposes a theory 
of language that unfolds from the appresentative elements connected to the 
sound of the voice (Luckmann 1975; 1983). In a manner consistent with the 
symbolic interactionism of G. H. Mead, he develops themes related to the lat-
er attempts of Schutz to address the phenomenological problem of language 
(cfr. Schutz 1958). Cicourel, however, articulated an ethnography of located 
contexts centered on the idea of language as a typical vehicle of knowledge 
and social practices that multidimensionally structure, “from the beginning”, 
relations between the actors in interaction, allowing the connection between 
individual and social structure (Cicourel 1973; 1981)41.
Finally, I borrow a thought from Schutz to say that I’m not sure if I was 
able to highlight the relevant aspects of the relationship between time, inter-
subjectivity and musical experience, and I’m not even sure if my observations 
are adequate to either the author or to those of whom have studied him. Of 
one thing, however, I am certain: that the relationship between time, inter-
subjectivity and musical relationship is a central aspect of the debate in the 
social sciences that has not yet been overcome.
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